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INTRODUCTION
The stock market boom of the 1990s fueled growth not only
for mergers and acquisitions, but also for investments by venture
capital companies around the world.' Cross-border work has now
"become the norm, rather than the exception."2 When different
jurisdictions are involved, however, compliance with each country's
securities and other disclosure related laws can be challenging As
more U.S. shareholders invest in foreign companies, and as more
foreign companies seek to raise capital in the U.S., potential
conflicts arise between foreign and domestic securities laws and
within the U.S. securities laws themselves. While each of the six
principal U.S. securities statutes administered by the U.S.
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focuses on corporate acquisitions and other commercial transactions. The author
would like to specially thank his father.
1. International M&A Boom Driven by Ample Finance, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, May 30, 2000 [hereinafter International M&A Boom]; see also Peter
Stinton, Venture-Capital Investing Pot Overflows, S.F. CHRON., May 6, 2000, at
B1 (discussing record investing by venture capital firms in the first quarter of
2000); Matt Marshall, Venture Capital Juggernaut Begins to Slow in Silicon
Valley, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 18, 2001.
2. Investment Bank Lazard Freres Positioned for Growth in Europe, Dow
JONES Bus. NEWS, Jan. 31, 2000.
3. See, e.g., Peter J. Sutro, Thinking About a Global Share Plan? Think
Smart, 31 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REv. 54 (1999) (discussing the growth of
global share plans and the regulatory hurdles companies must overcome in
creating such share plans).
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Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") attempts to address
a specific area of securities regulation, these statutes can, in certain
instances, overlap.'
This Article will focus on the relationship between section
3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act")6
and section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the
"1933 Act").7 Specifically, this Article examines whether or not
shares issued in reliance on the section 3(a)(10) exemption of the
1933 Act ("section 3(a)(10)") can be considered a "public offering"
for purposes of section 7(d) and 3(c)(1) of the 1940 Act ("section
3(c)(1)"). The rapid growth of hedge funds and venture capital
companies, coupled with the increase in international investment,
has made resolution of this uncertainty a necessity. This Article is
meant to provide some background and guidance to the
practitioner who encounters this issue.
Parts I and II will provide brief descriptions of the relevant
provisions of both the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act. Part III will
discuss the relationship between the two Acts, and Part IV will
analyze this relationship. Part V will conclude with a discussion of
the implications of section 3(c)(1) companies being able to-or not
being able to-rely on the section 3(a)(10) exemption.
4. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1.1 (2000). These six statutes are: (i) Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to z-3 (2002); (ii) Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to ff (2002); (iii) Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa
(2002); (iv) Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (2002); (v)
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a to a-64 (2002); (vi)
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to b-18a (2002).
5. Such instances of overlap include periodic reporting requirements, or the
regulation of investment companies. See WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 1.03 (2000); see also BLOOMENTHAL &
WOLFF, supra note 4, § 1.1; Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383
(1983) (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979) and SEC v.
Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969) to demonstrate that securities laws may
overlap).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).
7. Id. § 77c(a)(10).
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I. 1940 ACT
The focus of the 1940 Act8 is on "pooled investment vehicles,
such as mutual funds, closed-end funds, and unit investment
trusts."9  In the 1920s, the SEC found such investment vehicles
especially prone to "manipulation and self-dealing."'" As a result,
Congress enacted the 1940 Act," which provides, in part, that:
No investment company organized or otherwise created under
the laws of the United States or of a State and having a board of
directors, unless registered under section 8, shall directly or
indirectly-(1) offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale, by the
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, any security....12
Once registered, an investment company is substantially
restricted in its activities." Although the term "investment
8. Id. § 80a-1 to a-64.
9. Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, Private Investment Companies
Under Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 Bus. LAW. 401,
401 (1989).
10. DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 214 (1992). The Director
of the Division of Investment Management at the SEC stated that the 1940 Act
has been "one of the most successful statutes regulating financial institutions,"
and has been effective in "preventing many of the abusive practices that
prompted its adoption." Paul F. Roye, Maintaining the Pillars of Protection in
the New Millennium, Address Before the Investment Company Institute
(May 21, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch279.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2003). Specifically, the 1940 Act created protections in order to:
Give investors confidence that: (i) their investments will be managed in
accordance with the fund's investment objectives; (ii) the assets of the fund will
be kept safe; (iii) when they redeem, they will get their pro rata share of the
fund's assets; and (iv) the fund will be managed for the benefit of the fund's
shareholders and not the fund's adviser or its affiliates.
Id.
11. See RATNER, supra note 10, at 214.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a).
13. See RATNER, supra note 10, at 215. For example, forty percent of the
directors-or persons performing similar functions-must be independent; sales
by investment companies of additional equity securities at less than net asset
value are restricted; and an investment company may not incur debt if, after
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company" is broadly defined in the 1940 Act,14  Congress
specifically exempted certain entities from regulation." One
common exception is found in section 3(c)(1), 6 which excepts an
issuer "whose securities (excluding short-term paper) are
beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons... [so
long as] it is not making or proposing to make a public offering."17
Various entities rely on this exception, including trust funds,'8
leveraged buyout funds,'9 venture capital funds,' acquisition
vehicles, and hedge funds.
giving effect to the incurrence of such debt, the ratio of (a) assets less liabilities
other than such debt, to (b) such debt, would be less than thirty percent. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-1, et seq.; see also infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
14. Section 3(a)(1) states:
When used in this title, "investment company" means any issuer which-
(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and
has any such certificate outstanding; or
(C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on
an unconsolidated basis.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1).
15. See Lemke & Lins, supra note 9, at 401.
16. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).
17. See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 4, § 1.74. Specifically, the
statute states that an investment company is not "any issuer whose outstanding
securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than
one hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to
make a public offering of its securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).
18. See, e.g., Torchmark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,385 (Oct. 24, 1986); Fiduciaries' Index
Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,893 (June 25, 1976) (granting favorable treatment to a trust under
section 3(c)(1)).
19. See Lemke & Lins, supra note 9, at 401.
20. Jonathon B. Levine, Turning Points in the Lives of Companies; What It
Takes to Lure the Venture Capitalist, Bus. WK., Nov. 3, 1986, at 116.
21. TAMARA FRANKEL, 3 THE REG. OF MONEY MANAGERS 318-21 (1980).
Although "open to only a limited number of investors, these investing entities
SECTION 3(a) (10) EXEMPTION
A. Prong 1: Number of Persons
Section 3(c)(1) has essentially two requirements:' an issuer
cannot have "over 100 beneficial owners"' and it cannot be
"making or proposing to make a public offering of [its]
securities."'2 Although counting the number of beneficial owners
to satisfy the first prong seems relatively simple, since the inquiry
relates to "beneficial owners" and not just to stockholders, such an
approach is complex.' While neither "the 1940 Act nor the rules
[promulgated] pursuant to it define 'beneficial ownership,"' 2 no-
action letters have generally interpreted beneficial ownership
broadly' in order to "prevent investment company sponsors from
forming a public company that itself invests its assets in a private
investment vehicle."'  Thus, if a company holds "[ten] percent or
more of the outstanding voting securities of a section 3(c)(1) entity,
and in addition, has more than ten percent of its assets invested in
section 3(c)(1) entities, all of the shareholders of that company will
be considered beneficial owners of the entity."29
Focusing on the "public offering" prong of section 3(c)(1), if
the number of beneficial owners is fewer than 100, then the next
step in the section 3(c)(1) inquiry requires an analysis of the
"public offering" component."
often wield great amounts of capital due to the substantial investment each
investor makes." Lemke & Lins, supra note 9, at 401 n. 14; see also J.P. Morgan
& Co. Option Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1851
(July 13, 1977).
22. John H. Davis, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45309 (Apr. 20, 1984).
23. Although the 1940 Act does not define "beneficial ownership," see infra
notes 24-25 and accompanying text, in the SEC's view, "anyone possessing any
ownership interest in a company's debt or equity securities may be deemed a
beneficial owner for purposes of section 3(c)(1)." Lemke & Lins, supra note 9, at
406.
24. See Lemke & Lins, supra note 9, at 406.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The Investment Company Act of 1940, CORPORATE PRAcTICE SERIES A-
11 (1995).
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
30. See Lemke & Lins, supra note 9, at 427.
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B. Prong 2: A "Public Offering"
Scant legal precedent guides issuers in determining what
constitutes a public offering under section 3(c)(1).3 The SEC does
not "as a matter of policy, issue a no-action or interpretive letter on
the question of whether [an] offering is nonpublic. [Rather], it is
the issuer's responsibility to determine whether the offering is
nonpublic."32 The SEC has, however, "taken the position that, for
purposes of section 3(c)(1) of the 1940 Act, an offering is
nonpublic if it complies with section 4(2) of, or Rule 506 under, the
Securities Act of 1933.""3
Accordingly, an analysis of the 1933 Act becomes necessary.
II. THE 1933 AcT
The 1933 Act"4 is "essentially a disclosure statute"35 aiming to
"assure the availability of adequate reliable information about
securities that are offered to the public."36 As with the 1940 Act,37
the 1933 Act's main feature is its registration requirement.38
Subject to certain specific exemptions, no security- a term broadly
defined in the 1933 Act-can be offered or sold to the public unless
first registered with the SEC.39 However, Congress specifically
exempted securities and transactions from registration, ' ° where the
31. See id.
32. Stars & Stripes GNMA Funding Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,303 (Apr. 17, 1986). But an
issuer is able to seek exemptive relief. See, e.g., Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corp. and HSBC Holdings, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,696 (Jan. 29, 1991).
33. Stars & Stripes GNMA Funding Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,303 (Apr. 17, 1986).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-z-3 (2002).
35. RATNER, supra note 10, at 33.
36. Id. at 34.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to a-64.
38. See PRIFTi, supra note 5, § 1.03.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a)(1) (applying to securities sold or offered by way of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce).
40. J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES
SECTION 3(a) (10) EXEMPTION
"intrinsic nature of the issuer or the character of the security [or
transaction] itself.., would make further governmental regulation
superfluous."'" One such exemption is section 3(a)(10),42 which,
unfortunately suffers "from a relative paucity of authoritative
interpretation."43  Consequently, much of what is known about
section 3(a)(10)'s requirements and applicability comes from no-
action letters."4
A. Section 3(a)(10)
Section 3(a)(10) specifically exempts from registration any
security which is:
[Ilssued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding
securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such
exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of
such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon
the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to
whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall
have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or
agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial
banking or insurance commission or other governmental
authority expressly authorized by law to grant such approval.45
The SEC has determined that an issuer must satisfy the
following criteria to claim a section 3(a)(10) exemption:
The securities must be issued in exchange for securities, claims
or property interests; they cannot be offered for cash;
A court or authorized governmental entity must approve the
fairness of the terms and conditions of the exchange;
AcT OF 1933 § 1.01[3][a] (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 3.01[1].
43. Id. § 1.01[5][a].
44. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (2002).
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The reviewing court or authorized governmental entity must
find, before approving the transaction, that the terms and
conditions of the exchange are fair to those to whom securities
will be issued; and be notified before the hearing that the issuer
will rely upon the section 3(a)(10) exemption based on the
court's or authorized governmental entity's approval of the
transaction;
The court or authorized governmental entity must hold a
hearing before approving the fairness of the terms and
condition of the transaction;
A governmental entity must be expressly authorized by law to
hold the hearing, although it is not necessary that the law
require the hearing;
The fairness hearing must be open to everyone to whom
securities would be issued in the proposed exchange;
Adequate notice of the hearing must be given to all those
persons; and
There cannot be any improper impediments to the appearance
46by those persons at the hearing.
Many of these criteria focus on a reviewing court or similar
government entity because securities offered pursuant to section
3(a)(10) protect investors not so much through dissemination of a
disclosure document, 7 but through the substantive review by an
46. Revised Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 904 (Oct.
20, 1999); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a).
47. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Integration of
Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus. LAW. 595,
600 (1986) [hereinafter Integration of Securities Offerings] (noting, however, that
as a practical matter, a prospectus-like disclosure is still required); see also 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a) (exempting certain securities from the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act).
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impartial tribunal."8
According to the SEC, the main justification for exempting
section 3(a)(10) securities from registration is because the
"examination and approval by the body in question of the fairness
of the issue in question is a substitute for the protection afforded to
the investor by the information which would otherwise be made
available to him through registration."49 In fact, "[m]any regulators
would consider this form [a substantive review by an impartial
tribunal as provided in section 3(a)(10)] ... [to be] a form of
protection superior to the [1933] Act's registration process,""0
notwithstanding the fact that the impartial tribunal can be a court
in a foreign country.5 Indeed, with the SEC's blessing,52 foreign
companies in cross-border acquisitions are able to rely on section
3(a)(10) to exempt from registration those securities that it will
issue to U.S. shareholders.53
48. See Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 47, at 600. In fact,
"[miany regulators would consider this form of protection superior to the [1933]
Act's registration process, as there is always a strong likelihood that many, if not
most, offerees would not read a prospectus if it were disseminated to them,
assuming they even received it prior to their purchase." Id. at 602.
49. Securities Act Release No. 312, [1935-1936 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 2,181, at 2,951 (Mar. 15, 1935).
50. Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 47, at 602.
51. See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 755 (July 25,
1997) (stating that it "is the Division's view that the term 'any court' in section
3(a)(10) may include a foreign court" provided that the requirements are met).
52. See HICKS, supra note 40, § 3.04[1][a].
53. See, e.g., Mechala Group Jamaica Ltd. and Indus. Commercial Dev. Ltd.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 252 (Feb. 24, 2000) (Jam. Sup.
Ct.); ADC Telecommunications, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 657 (July 30, 1999) (Ir. High Ct.); Lason Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 557 (June 7, 1999) (Eng.); Omnicom Group, Inc. SEC
No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 294 (Jan. 28, 1999) (Eng. & Wales);
ForBio, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 880 (Sept. 23,
1998) (Austl. & Queensland Sup. Ct.); StaffMark, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 830 (Sept. 3, 1998) (Eng.); Lytton Minerals Ltd. and
New Indigo Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
379 (Mar. 6, 1998) (Alberta Court of the Queen's Bench); EXEL Ltd., Mid
Ocean Ltd. Exel Merger Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
691 (July 2, 1998) (Cayman Is. Grand Ct.); China Light & Power Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS (Jan. 2, 1998) (H.K. High Ct. Special
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III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 3(a)(10) AND SECTION
3(c)(1)
Although exempt from the registration requirements of the
1933 Act, section 3(a)(10) securities are still subject to other U.S.
securities laws." For example, section 3(a) of the 1933 Act does
not provide an exemption from section 10(b)-the insider trading
rules-of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."5  The Trust
Indenture Act of 193956 does not "include an exemption that is the
equivalent of section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act. [Thus, i]f an
issuer is relying on section 3(a)(10) to offer and sell debt securities
without [1933] Act registration, it should note that the Trust
Indenture Act would still apply to that offering."57
In this vein, the issue arises of whether or not section 3(a)(10)
securities will trigger the public offering component of other
securities acts, such as section 3(c)(1) of the 1940 Act. 8 If the
answer is yes, then such an issuer can no longer rely on the section
3(c)(1) exception because it would no longer meet the two prong
test of section 3(c)(1), 9 and would thus be required to register
under the 1940 Act.' If the answer is no, then a whole host of
hedge funds and foreign investment companies can utilize the
section 3(a)(10) exemption to offer their securities as consideration
in an acquisition, and still rely on section 3(c)(1) to avoid the
Admin. Region); Pioneer Natural Resources Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1032 (Nov. 25, 1997) (Alberta Queens Bench); Cadillac
Fairview, Inc.; The Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited; Cadillac Fairview
Urban Properties Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 520
(May 26, 1995) (Cana. Ct.).
54. See, e.g., Leoni v. Rogers, 719 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding
that stockholders of a closely held corporation, all of whom were family, lacked
standing to bring an action for securities fraud because they did not purchase the
stock; there was a redemption of stock and only the corporation had standing).
55. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 78a-ff.
56. Id. § 77aaa.
57. Revised Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 904 (Oct.
20, 1999).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).
59. See supra notes 22, 23 and accompanying text.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to a-64.
SECTION 3(a)(10) EXEMPTION
onerous requirements imposed by 1940 Act registration." This
interplay between section 3(a)(10) securities and section 3(c)(1) is
particularly relevant to the many foreign investment companies
that wish to exploit section 3(a)(10) by issuing securities-once
highly valued-as consideration in acquisitions to U.S.
shareholders.62
As outlined in Part I, an offering is "not public" for purposes
of section 3(c)(1) if it complies with section 4(2) of, or Rule 506
under, the 1933 Act.63 Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts from
registration transactions "by an issuer not involving any public
offering."' The determination of what constitutes a public offering
is "essentially a question of fact., 65 An important interpretation of
the requirements of public offerings is the 1953 U.S. Supreme
Court decision66 in Ralston Purina Co. 67 The Court attempted to
clarify section 4(2) by stating that:68
The design of the... [1933 Act] is to protect investors by
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions. The natural way to interpret
the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory
61. See id. § 80a-18d; see also RATNER, supra note 10; infra notes 102, 103
and accompanying text.
62. Recent merger and acquisition activity has "been driven by rising stock
prices, giving companies an acquisition currency with which to buy other
companies." See International M&A Boom, supra note 1. Although not
investment companies, many of the recent acquisitions, such as AOL/Time
Warner, Vodafone Air Touch/Mannesmann, British Petroleum/Amoco have
been purchased with stock. See EU Takeover Rules, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9,
2000.
63. John H. Davis, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45309 (Apr. 20, 1984);
see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77a4(2).
65. Securities Act Release No. 5,121, 1970 SEC LEXIS 1463 (Dec. 30, 1970).
66. See PRIFTI, supra note 5, § 1.05.
67. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). In this case, the SEC
sought to enjoin a corporation from offering its stock to its employees without
complying with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. Id. The Court held
that the availability of any exemption is to be considered in light of the intent of
the statute and the need to protect investors by providing full and fair disclosure.
Id.
68. See PRIFTI, supra note 5, § 1.05.
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purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which
"there is no practical need for [the bill's] application," [sic] the
applicability of § 4(1) should turn on whether the particular
69
class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act.
The Court further stated that "the exemption question turns
on the knowledge of the offerees... [and, therefore,] the focus of
inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protection
afforded by [a] registration [statement]." '7 Thus, the crux of the
analysis focuses on the offerees themselves. The SEC has issued a
number of releases describing certain offeree characteristics to be
evaluated when determining whether an offering is public or
private. Such factors include: (a) the number and identity of
offerees; (b) the size of the offering; and (c) the manner of the
offering.
A. Number of Offerees
Although nothing prevents the SEC from using a strict
numerical test in deciding what rises to the level of a public
offering, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the number of
offerees is not conclusive as to the availability of the nonpublic
exemption.73 It is not even a question of the number "of actual
purchasers, but [rather] the number of persons to whom the
security in question is offered for sale." 4 Negotiations with a large,
unrelated group of prospective purchasers with little association or
knowledge of the issuer are typical in public offerings," even if few
offerees ultimately purchase shares. 6 It is the identity of the initial
offerees-and not just the actual purchasers-that is significant."
69. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 124-25.
70. Id. at 126-27.
71. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (Jan. 1935);
Id. No. 4,552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (Nov. 1962); supra note 65.
72. Securities Act Release No. 4,552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316, 2770 (Nov. 1962).
73. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125.
74. Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952, 2741 (Jan. 1935).
75. Id. 2771.
76. Securities Act Release No. 4,552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316, 2772 (Nov. 1962).
77. Id.
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Thus, an offering to persons who are able to "fend for themselves
would most likely indicate a transaction not involving any public
offering.""8
B. Size of Offering
The larger the size of the offering, the more likely it will be
considered public.79  A multi-million dollar offering to non-
institutional and non-affiliated investors would thus tend to
indicate a public offering." Similarly, an offering in connection
with a "settlement of a class action or a business combination
where the corporation to be acquired is not closely held would
more likely be a transaction involving a public offering."'" Since a
class action or a non-closely held corporation would have a large,
diverse, and unsophisticated number of shareholders, such offerees
may need the protections typically afforded investors in public
offerings.
C. Manner of the Offering
A determination of whether an offering is public or private
"also include[s] a consideration of the question of whether it
should be regarded as part of a larger offering."82 Indeed, it is not
enough to focus narrowly on a specific offering. 83 Section 4(2) of
the 1933 Act' does not "exempt every transaction, which is not
itself a public offering."' Rather, the statute exempts "transactions
not 'involving' any public offering."86  Thus, a person may not
separate small parts of a series of related transactions-each of
78. See PRIM, supra note 5, § 1.05.
79. Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952, 2743 (Jan. 1935).
80. Id. No. 4,552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316, T 2775 (Nov. 1962).
81. See HiCKS, supra note 40, § 3.06[2].
82. Securities Act Release No. 4,552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316, 2782 (Nov. 1962).
83. Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 47, at 610.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4)(2) (2002).
85. Securities Act Release No. 2,029, 1939 SEC LEXIS 322, *6 (Aug. 8,
1939).
86. Id.
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which alone would have been a private transaction, but the sum
total of which is really one offering-and claim that a particular
part is a non-public transaction merely to avoid registration.' The
SEC uses additional factors to determine whether or not a series of
transactions should be integrated: whether (1) the different
offerings are part of a single plan of financing; (2) the offerings
involve issuance of the same class of security; (3) the offerings are
made at or about the same time; (4) the same type of consideration
is to be received; or (5) the offerings are made for the same general
purpose.88
IV. ANALYSIS
The determination of whether or not a section 3(a)(10)
offering will be deemed non-public under section 4(2) of the 1933
Act89-and fall within the parameters of section 3(c)(1)-is thus
made on a case by case, characteristic by characteristic basis. Each
of the "public offering" factors, such as, the number of offerees,
the size of the offering, and the manner of the offeringg'-and
whether the offerees need the protections of the 1933 Act92 -will
87. Integration of Securities Offerings, supra note 47, at 610.
88. Id.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4)(2).
90. Id. § 80a-3(c)(1).
91. Securities Act Release No. 4,552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316, %% 2771-82 (Nov.
1962). Other factors include whether or not the shares were offered to
employees, sold to promoters, acquired for investment, retained for long periods
of time, or sold to institutional investors. Id.
92. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The Court wrote:
The design of the statute [the 1933 Act] is to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.
The natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the
statutory purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which "there is no
practical need for... (the bill's) [sic] application," the applicability of section
4(1) [now 4(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected
need the protection of the Act. Any offering to those who are shown to be able
to fend for themselves is a transaction "not involving any public offering."
Id. at 124-25. The preamble of the 1933 Act itself also illustrates this point, as it
states that the 1993 Act is "[a]n Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
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be scrutinized.
The foregoing criteria are helpful in providing some guidance
to those wishing to rely on both section 3(a)(10) and section
3(c)(1). The SEC, however, has never expressly ruled on this issue,
although it has been presented with the question.93 An issuer
hoping to rely on section 3(a)(10) to issue shares as consideration
in an acquisition and avoid the registration requirements of the
1940 Act argued in a no-action letter that its section 3(a)(10)
offering should not be considered "public." The issuer relied on
the position that U.S. shareholders receiving the section 3(a)(10)
shares were, in its transaction, merely changing their shares as an
investment in one company to one in a similar company.94 The
letter specifically argued that
[I]n the context of a corporate reorganization exempt from
registration under section 3(a)(10) of the 1933 Act and
involving no new investment decisions and no fundamental
change in the underlying investment, and where the underlying
securities entered the U.S. markets through secondary market
trading, it would be inappropriate to treat the transaction as
involving a 'public offering' for purposes of section 7(d) of the
1940 Act.95
The SEC, however, responded on an unrelated issue and did
not address the validity of this argument. In fact, the SEC stated
that the petitioner should not have requested a no-action letter
because its situation "is the type of transaction [that] should
generally be approved through the exemptive process."96 Was the
SEC indicating that exemptive relief would be granted in such a
situation? Could a section 3(c)(1) company thus seek specific
relief from the SEC and rely on section 3(a)(10) to issue shares?
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." 15
U.S.C. § 77a.
93. See Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. and HSBC Holdings, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,696
(Jan. 29, 1991).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Because the SEC has never resolved this issue, and because of the
uncertainty in the language of the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act, the
answer, unfortunately, remains unclear.
V. IMPLICATIONS
If a section 3(c)(1) company is unable to rely on the section
3(a)(10) exemption in a certain instance, it is limited to basically
two options: it can either (1) not proceed with the transaction, or
(2) register itself as an investment company.97  Option one
obviously ends the discussion. Option two would free a company
from having to rely on both the 100 beneficial owner and "public
offering" confines of section 3(c)(1). However, registration
pursuant to the 1940Act carries with it numerous other
requirements that are more burdensome98 than either attempting to
structure a certain transaction as "private"," or seeking some sort
of exemptive relief from the SEC. In fact, registration is not a very
realistic solution.
Some of the 1940 Act's more onerous provisions are its severe
limitations on a registered investment company's capital structure.
An investment company cannot: (i) have more than one class of
preferred stock;'" (ii) have more than one class of non-bank debt;''
or (iii) issue warrants or options for a period of more than 120
days, even to employees."° In addition, companies that wish to
utilize section 3(a)(10) are foreign companies also relying on the
section 3(c)(1) exemption, and who wish to avoid the expense and
complications of full 1933 Act registration.
However, a "corporation that is not organized under U.S. law
cannot as a practical matter register under the [19]40 Act.' 0 3
section 7(d) of the 1940 Act prohibits a company organized outside
the United States "from registering as an investment company and
97. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a).
98. See supra note 13; infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4)(2); see also supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 80a-18(d).
103. The Investment Company Act of 1940, supra note 28, at A-9.
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making a public offering in the United States, unless the SEC
issues an order permitting it to register..'.. The SEC, however, is
only authorized to issue such an order if it finds that: "[(1)] it is
both legally and practically feasible to effectively enforce the
provisions of [the 1940 Act] ... against ... [the funds;] and
[(2)] that the issuance of such order is otherwise consistent with the
public interest and the protection of investors."' 5 This standard,
"which is referred to commonly as the 'enforceability' standard,
historically has proven difficult for foreign companies to meet." In
fact,
The SEC has only permitted 19 foreign funds, mostly from
Canada, to register under the [19]40 Act; it last granted such
permission in 1973. Even though § 7(d) [of the 1940 Act] refers
only to "public offerings," the commission, reading the section
in connection with § 3(c)(1) of the [1940 Act .... has
interpreted § 7(d) to prohibit a foreign fund from making a
private offering to more than 100 U.S. resident investors
without obtaining SEC approval. An unregistered foreign fund
may, however, make a private offering of its securities to U.S.
residents, grovided the fund does not have more than 100 U.S.
investors.
Indeed, the SEC has stated that "[b]y its terms, section 7(d)
does not preclude a foreign investment company from offering its
shares privately in the United States"'0 7 because "Congress could
not have intended unregistered foreign funds to be able to conduct
private placements in the United States larger than those permitted
to be conducted by unregistered private investment companies
organized under U.S. law."' " In this vein, the inquiry as to whether
a section 3(a)(10) offering will be deemed public or private
becomes even more crucial.
Another potential pitfall would be the consequences of a loss
of the section 3(c)(1) safe harbor. If the consummation of a section
104. Id.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d).
106. The Investment Company Act of 1940, supra note 28, at A-9.
107. Investment Funds Institute of Canada, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 334 (Mar. 4, 1996).
108. Id.
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3(a)(10) transaction stripped a company of the ability to use the
section 3(c)(1) exception, that U.S. company might be deemed an
investment company. Section 47 of the 1940 Act' 9 "generally
renders any contract made by an unregistered investment company
unenforceable.""0 Furthermore, the SEC has, in the past, brought
a number of enforcement actions against entities whose business
activities brought them within the definition of an investment
company, thus exposing that entity to penalties for creating an
unregistered investment company. " '
Accordingly, the stakes are high for a section 3(c)(1) company
that wishes to rely on section 3(a)(10) to make its securities
offerings. If its offering is not structured correctly, the issuer not
only jeopardizes its ability to complete the section 3(a)(10)
offering, but also risks exposing itself to penalties for conducting an
offering without first registering under the 1940 Act. If the issuer
attempts to wade through the current uncertainty and hedge
against unforeseen risk, it will most likely incur considerable legal
expenses and other costs. In light of the foregoing, it is
understandable if the issuer chooses not to proceed with any
section 3(a)(10) offering that might endanger its section 3(c)(1)
status.
Historically, when issuers have been hampered by uncertainty
or unintended legal exposure, the SEC has offered clarity by
promulgating explanatory rules, protection by creating safe
harbors, or both."' For example, in an attempt to provide issuers
109. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46.
110. The Investment Company Act of 1940, supra note 28, at A-9. The
language of this section goes on to state that a contract will not be rendered
unenforceable if "a court finds that under the circumstances enforcement would
produce a more equitable result than nonenforcement and would not be
inconsistent with the purposes of [the Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1).
111. See, e.g., SEC v. Dart Group Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12392 (D.D.C. Feb.
28, 1990) (holding that Dart Group violated the 1940 Act by acting as an
investment company as defined in section 3(c)(1) without first registering with
the SEC pursuant to section 8(a) thereof).
112. Regulation D, Rules 501-509, issued under the 1933 Act, provide
exemption from the 1933 Act registration requirements for sales to "accredited
investors." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2002); see also Regulation S, Rules 901-
905 under the 1933 Act, which provide a safe harbor for offshore sales. 17 C.F.R.
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with guidance on securities offerings made outside the United
States, the SEC promulgated Regulation S."' Rules 903 and 90414
afford issuers with certain "safe harbors, compliance with which
serves to establish that registration under the 1933 Act is not
required." ' 5  Similarly, in 1982, the SEC "took a major step in
simplifying and coordinating the exemptions for limited [securities]
offerings"" 6 by adopting Regulation D."7 Rules 501 through 508
were designed to "simplify and clarify existing exemptions, to
expand their availability, and to achieve uniformity between
federal and state exemptions in order to facilitate capital formation
consistent with the protection of investors."1 8  Thus, since
companies were unsure of the requirements to register securities
issued outside the U.S., and issuers needed clarification of their
obligations when making discrete offerings to accredited investors,
the SEC responded by issuing Regulation S and Regulation D.
Today, section 3(c)(1) issuers find themselves similarly
perplexed and vulnerable to legal exposure and enforcement
actions. Without relief, these issuers will be limited to making
section 3(a)(10) offerings that are encumbered by an excess of the
public offering requirements of the 1933 Act. Yet, even with such
an approach, issuers have no assurance that they will not have
violated the 1940 Act, the 1933 Act, or both. Consequently, now is
an appropriate, indeed necessary time for the SEC to provide
guidance to section 3(c)(1) companies that wish to avail themselves
of the U.S. capital markets.
One approach the SEC might take is to promulgate a rule that
would set forth what section 3(c)(1) companies need to do to
§§ 230.901-.903 (2002).
113. Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions
Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 6,863 (Mar. 8,
1982), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.903.
114. Id. §§ 230.903-.904.
115. Regulation S: the Safe Harbor for Offshore Securities Transactions,
CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES A-5 (1997).
116. See RATNER, supra note 10, at 58.
117. Id.
118. Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions
Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 6,863 (Mar. 8,
1982).
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ensure that they are conducting a valid section 3(a)(10) offering.
The rule could outline which private offering characteristics should
be part of a section 3(a)(10) offering; in other words, it would
codify which section 4(2) criteria must be present so that the
section 3(a)(10) offering is not deemed "public."
For example, the following language might provide the section
3(c)(1) issuer with the necessary guidance and protection:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7(d) of the 1940 Act,
an issuer relying on, and satisfying the requirements of, section
3(c)(1) of the 1940 Act shall be able to utilize the mails and
interstate commerce to offer securities; provided that all of the
following conditions are satisfied: (i) the securities are offered
in reliance on, and satisfy the requirements of, section 3(a)(10)
of the 1933 Act; (ii) the offering is made solely to accredited
investors, or to accredited investors and no more than 50 non-
accredited investors; (iii) the value of the offering is not in
excess of $50 million; (iv) the offering is narrowly tailored to the
intended offerees; and (v) a reasonable person would determine
that the offerees are protected to the extent they would have
been had the security been first registered pursuant to the 1933
Act.
So long as a transaction satisfied the foregoing requirements,
issuers would no longer jeopardize their section 3(c)(1) status when
making section 3(a)(10) offerings, and would thus be more likely to
conduct section 3(a)(10) offerings. Such an increase in equity
offerings would enable section 3(c)(1) issuers to expand their
shareholder base and to raise additional capital. Additionally, U.S.
investors would benefit because they would then have more
opportunities to acquire section 3(a)(10) securities as investment
opportunities.
Until the SEC rules directly on this issue or creates a safe
harbor, the best available protection for a section 3(c)(1) issuer-
the party who has the burden of proving that section 4(2) of the
1933 Act would apply"'1 -is to structure its section 3(a)(10) offering
with as many "private" offering criteria as possible so as not to
119. See HiCKS, supra note 40, § 3.01[1]. As is true with any exemption,
claiming a section 3(a)(10) protection carries with it the burden of proving
compliance with all of the requirements. Id.
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trigger the "public offering" component of the 1940 Act. Yet,
unfortunately, even if the section 3(c)(1) issuer manages to fashion
its transaction with numerous "private" offering factors, it has no
assurance that the SEC will not bring an enforcement action
against it for making a public offering, if the issuer first did not
register under the 1940 Act.
Notes & Observations
